BY:SpaceEyeNews.
Artemis cannot work: why Congress is suddenly worried about losing the Moon
For years, US politicians spoke confidently about returning American astronauts to the lunar surface under NASA’s Artemis program. Now, a blunt message is echoing through Washington: Artemis cannot work in its current form, and China may plant the next flag on the Moon first.
During a recent hearing of the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, experts warned lawmakers that NASA’s current architecture is too complex, too fragile, and too slow to beat China’s focused lunar plan. Former NASA administrator Michael Griffin went even further. In written and spoken testimony, he argued that the Artemis III mission and those beyond should be canceled and redesigned from scratch if the United States truly wants to stay ahead. Ars Technica+1
At the same time, analysts reminded Congress that China has a clear, long-term roadmap for a crewed lunar landing around 2030 and a joint International Lunar Research Station in the 2030s. China State Council+1 If NASA continues with a plan that many insiders now describe as unworkable, the US could lose not just a symbolic race, but a key arena of economic and technological influence in cislunar space.
This article unpacks why some experts say “Artemis cannot work,” what happened at the hearing, how China’s plan differs, and why members of Congress are finally talking about real consequences for delays and overruns.
Why Congress is finally hearing that Artemis cannot work
A hearing born from fear of China’s rise
The trigger for this debate was a hearing focused on NASA’s future in an era of intensifying competition with China. Members of the House Science, Space, and Technology Committee asked a simple but uncomfortable question: Can NASA still lead the world in space if its flagship Moon program keeps slipping to the right on the schedule? Ars Technica+1
Lawmakers have watched costs rise and timelines stretch for years. Major exploration programs such as the Space Launch System (SLS), Orion, and associated ground systems are billions of dollars over budget and many years late. Ars Technica+1 Yet every year the money continues to flow, while milestones drift. Until now, most of the frustration stayed behind closed doors.
The hearing changed that. For the first time in a while, witnesses told Congress in public that the current path may never deliver what Artemis promises, especially when measured against China’s more direct approach.
The expert panel that broke the spell
Three voices shaped the discussion:
- Michael Griffin, former NASA administrator and long-time critic of the current Artemis architecture. docs.house.gov+1
- Clayton Swope, deputy director of the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Ars Technica
- Dean Cheng, a senior fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, known for his analysis of Chinese space strategy. Ars Technica+1
Each approached the problem from a different angle. Griffin focused on the technical and architectural flaws, Swope on NASA’s role in the broader US innovation ecosystem, and Cheng on accountability, contracts, and consequences. Together they painted a picture in which “Artemis cannot work” is not just a slogan but a serious policy warning.
The core critique: why Michael Griffin says Artemis cannot work
An architecture built on unproven refueling chains
Griffin’s central argument is brutal in its simplicity: the current Artemis landing architecture depends on an extremely high number of in-orbit refueling flights in low-Earth orbit, using cryogenic propellant transfer technology that has never been demonstrated in space at the required scale. Ars Technica+1
NASA’s chosen Human Landing System (HLS) strategy leans heavily on large commercial vehicles that need multiple tanker launches to fill a depot or a lander before heading to the Moon. Public estimates for some concepts run into the double digits for the number of launches required for a single crewed landing attempt. Space+1
In his prepared statement to the committee, Griffin summed it up this way:
An architecture which requires a high number of refueling flights in low-Earth orbit, using a technology not yet demonstrated, is very unlikely to work—unlikely to the point where I will say it cannot work. docs.house.gov+1
When one launch slips or one docking fails, the chain collapses, the mission resets, and timelines slide. In Griffin’s view, this is not how you design a program that must beat a focused competitor with a simpler plan.
“Apollo on steroids” vs. fragile complexity
Griffin proposes a different path. It looks more like an updated Apollo architecture: heavy-lift rockets, a robust lunar lander, fewer mission-critical steps, and no dependence on massive on-orbit refueling chains. This “Apollo on steroids” style concept is similar to what he championed during the Constellation era.
Critics note that earlier versions of this approach were deemed unaffordable within NASA’s existing budget. Griffin counters that the current path is burning enormous sums anyway, while delivering little progress toward a realistic crewed landing. From his perspective, the US has already lost time and money by sticking with a plan he believes never made sense.
Calling for a hard reset of Artemis III and beyond
The most explosive part of Griffin’s testimony is his prescription. He argues that if Congress truly wants to stay ahead of China, it must cancel Artemis III and subsequent missions as currently designed and start over with a more robust architecture. Ars Technica+1
This is the heart of the claim that “Artemis cannot work.” Griffin is not suggesting minor tweaks, but a wholesale redesign that prioritizes operational simplicity and proven technologies over experimental refueling mega-chains. That message forces lawmakers to confront a tough choice: either they defend the current plan as workable, or they accept the need for a reset that could be politically painful in the short term.
China’s straight line to the Moon vs. NASA’s zigzag
A clear Chinese roadmap to a crewed lunar landing
While NASA debates architectures, China has laid out a relatively consistent path toward a crewed lunar landing around 2030, followed by a permanent International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) in partnership with Russia and other partners in the 2030s. China State Council+2ويكيبيديا+2
Key elements of China’s plan include:
- A sequence of Chang’e robotic missions, including sample returns, far-side exploration, and polar scouting.
- Development of a new heavy-lift rocket to support crewed lunar flights. Universe Today+1
- A two-launch profile: one launch for the crew spacecraft, another for the lunar lander, which then dock in lunar orbit before descent. فيسبوك+1
In many ways, this blueprint resembles an updated Apollo-style approach—exactly the kind of architecture Griffin describes as “a plan that makes sense.”
NASA’s political zigzag and moving targets
By contrast, NASA’s path from Constellation to Artemis has involved repeated resets. Constellation was canceled. SLS and Orion survived. The program goal evolved from “back to the Moon” to “asteroid redirect” and then back to the lunar surface, this time under the Artemis branding and a new mix of commercial partnerships. reconnect-china.ugent.be+1
Every change in White House or congressional leadership has brought new priorities, stretched timelines, and altered milestones. The hardware stack built for one strategy has been repurposed for another. Griffin told lawmakers that China is sticking to a plan that makes sense, while the US has stuck to a plan that does not, especially for Artemis III. Ars Technica+1
Why “who lands first” matters
Some argue that it should not matter whether China or the US lands the next crewed mission first, as long as both explore peacefully. But many policy experts disagree.
As several analyses have pointed out, the first country to establish a sustained presence on the lunar surface will shape the norms, partnerships, and economic rules of cislunar space. Universe Today+1 Access to ice, volatiles, and key locations near the poles could underpin communications hubs, resource extraction, and future missions outward to Mars.
In that context, the statement “Artemis cannot work” is not just about a technical debate. It is about whether the US will influence or merely react to the rules of the next phase of lunar activity.
Contracts, delays, and why there “need to be consequences”
A long history of late and over-budget programs
Beyond architecture, witnesses hammered on a deeper structural problem: NASA’s big exploration programs slip, yet face few real penalties.
SLS, Orion, and their associated systems are now years late compared to original projections and billions over initial cost estimates. Ars Technica+1 Many of these projects have been run under cost-plus contracts, where companies are reimbursed for costs plus a fixed fee. That model reduces the contractor’s incentive to deliver on time and on budget.
Congress has often complained about these overruns. Yet it has also repeatedly extended funding, in part to preserve jobs in key states and districts.
Dean Cheng: priorities must come with teeth
Dean Cheng’s message to lawmakers was straightforward: priorities without consequences are just talking points. Ars Technica+1
He argued that if Artemis and US leadership in space are truly national priorities, then failure to meet agreed milestones should trigger real consequences—budgetary, legal, and contractual. That could mean shifting work away from under-performing contractors, enforcing more fixed-price structures when appropriate, or cutting programs that repeatedly miss targets.
In other words, if Artemis cannot work in its present contractual and management environment, then Congress must change not only the hardware plan but also the incentive structure around it.
Clayton Swope: don’t lose sight of NASA’s innovation engine
Clayton Swope offered a complementary warning. NASA is not only about rockets and lunar flags. It is a core driver of US innovation, feeding the commercial space sector and broader technology ecosystem.
He pointed to programs such as Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS), which support private lander companies delivering science instruments and technology demos to the Moon. Ars Technica That model harnesses competition and commercial agility rather than locking everything into a single giant government-run stack.
Swope urged lawmakers to view NASA’s authorization and budget as the “flywheel” of an innovation ecosystem that strengthens national security and economic competitiveness in ways China finds hard to match. Cutting Artemis without building a smarter replacement, or hollowing out science and technology budgets, would damage that flywheel just as competition intensifies.
What happens if Artemis cannot work and nothing changes?
The hearing leaves NASA and Congress facing a stark set of options.
One path is to defend the current architecture, accept the complexity of large-scale refueling, and hope that rapid progress in commercial launch makes the concept practical in time. That route would require much tighter program management and an honest reassessment of schedules and risk.
The other path is the one Griffin sketches: admit that Artemis cannot work as built, reset the lunar landing architecture, and design a simpler, more robust plan that can realistically compete with China’s timeline. That approach might reuse some existing hardware but would treat sunk costs as sunk, not as a reason to keep going down a flawed path.
In both scenarios, Cheng and Swope’s warnings still apply. Congress must decide whether it is willing to attach real consequences to chronic delays and overruns, and whether it will protect NASA’s role as an innovation engine rather than treating the agency as just another line item.
Conclusion: can the US fix Artemis before China owns the next “giant leap”?
The message coming out of Washington is no longer comfortable. A former NASA administrator tells Congress that “Artemis cannot work” as designed. Analysts caution that China’s steady, Apollo-like roadmap gives it a credible shot at landing a crewed mission before the US returns. And policy experts insist that big declarations about space leadership mean very little without enforcement, accountability, and smarter investment. Ars Technica+2Space+2
For SpaceEyeNews readers, the core question is simple but urgent: will the United States adapt in time? Real adaptation would mean rethinking Artemis architecture, reforming contract structures, and strengthening NASA’s role as the engine of a broader innovation ecosystem, all while China pushes ahead with its own lunar ambitions.
If Congress treats this hearing as a turning point, it might still reshape Artemis into a program that works—and works fast enough. If not, future history books may describe a decade in which the world watched China take the next great step on the Moon, while the original lunar pioneer stalled under a plan many insiders already warned could not work.